On 16 June 2026 Baroness Stowell introduced the Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Bill (“the Bill”) into the House of Lords. An identical bill has been introduced in the House of Commons by Sir John Whittingdale MP.

Unfortunately, despite its title, the Bill is not focussed on the issue of “SLAPPs” or abusive litigation.  Rather it imperfectly imitates a flawed Canadian precedent and is likely itself to lead to “unmeritorious and protracted litigation”.  In what follows I will seek to explain why.

The breadth of the Bill

The Bill was warmly welcomed across the media and by Anti-SLAPP campaigners. In reporting on these parliamentary developments, the UK Anti-SLAPP coalition reminded readers that

“Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are abusive legal threats that are not necessarily intended to win in court, but rather to silence, intimidate or financially exhaust those speaking out in the public interest … SLAPPs are also used by powerful actors against local campaigners, whistleblowers, victims of crime, including sexual abuse, and members of online communities”.

This a useful summary of the notion of the SLAPP as relied on by campaigners but, curiously, the Bill does not mention such “threats” at all. The term “SLAPP” appears only in the Bill’s title and in a curious “deeming provision”, clause 1(4) which provides that, if an application to dismiss is successful the action “must be” referred to (referred to by whom is not stated) as a claim found to be a SLAPP! This “statutory label” has no practical effect or relevance.

The Bill makes no mention of “abusive legal threats” or the activities of “powerful actors”. It does not deal with the silencing of critics or the improper use of legal procedures. Instead

  • It applies to any claim where the subject matter to which the claim relates is a matter of public interest”, whether or not the claim is abusive, whether or not it is meritorious.
  • It applies to a claim brought for any purpose or with any intention. The claim does not have to be brought to silence critical speech – it can be a good faith action intended only to vindicate reputation.
  • It applies to claims which are scrupulously and properly conducted, without any intention to harass or inconvenience the defendant.
  • It applies to claim brought by any kind of claimant against any kind of defendant – to “paradigm SLAPP claims”, brought by rich claimants against poor defendants but also to claims by poor claimants against rich defendants. An oligarch bullying a blogger is treated in the same way as an ordinary person claiming against a powerful media organisation.

Public Interest

The only requirements for a person to obtain the generous protections offered by the Bill is for the claim to relate to a “publication, statement or activity” carried out in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and for the subject matter to which the claim relates being a matter of public interest.

It is important to understand what this means. “Public interest” includes the obvious and established categories such as politics; corruption; crime or; terrorism. However, it is likely that the courts will give these words a wider interpretation. In the Canadian case law “public interest” covers anything in relation to which some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information about (see 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, [27]). In Canada defendants satisfy this test in 86% of cases.  The same approach is likely to be taken by the English courts.

Furthermore, the test will be whether the subject matter of the expression relates to a matter of public interest, not whether it in fact advances the public interest.  The publication could be entirely inaccurate; indeed, it could be deliberately so. That does not matter at all, provided the topic to which it relates is a matter of public interest.

In other words, the “stay” and costs protections in the Bill do not only extend to the types of case usually mentioned by Anti-SLAPP activists: good faith responsible journalists investigating wrongdoing in the public interest, local campaigners and so on. They also extend to lazy irresponsible journalists who have failed properly to assess the evidence, to obsessives and conspiracy theorists and to malicious individuals spreading deliberate misinformation. They extend to the tabloid press.  A claim relating to a publication which turns out to have been made by a Kremlin funded conspiracy theorist that pro-Ukraine campaigners are linked to terrorists “relates to a matter of public interest” and would be stayed.

Stay and Security for Costs

Under clause 1(2) of the Bill, if an application for early determination is made then the claim “must” be stayed until the application is determined. This will inevitably take many months – in Canada applications routinely take over 6 months and often result in appeals (the most recent Anti-SLAPP case before the Supreme Court of Canada was heard in May 2026 and concerns publications in late 2020 and early 2021, judgment is awaited). In England this is likely to be longer because, in contrast to Canada, determination requires a full merits investigation (see below).

The provision in the Bill for an automatic stay provides another benefit for defendants. If the claimant is seeking an interim injunction (for example in a privacy case to prevent publication of intimate information) it appears that a defendant can prevent an injunction hearing by making an immediate dismissal application under the provisions and, as a result, automatically staying the claim. If the claim is stayed, no injunction or any other hearing can go ahead. The defendant can publish the private information and the privacy action then becomes academic. The Bill provides for no exceptions. This provision will, doubtless, be welcomed by the tabloids which have consistently unsuccessfully opposed privacy injunctions on the merits but are now provided with a procedural trump card.

Once an application for early determination is made, the claimant must, if it is just and appropriate, provide security for the defendant’s costs: clause 2(3). This is a potent weapon in the hands of defendants (and is likely to cause further delay). There is no parallel in any other civil proceedings for a claimant, no matter the merits of the case, no matter the respective financial resources of each side and no matter whether the claimant is within the jurisdiction of the court, to be vulnerable to an order for security in this way, purely to allow their claim to proceed.

The hearing of the application

When the dismissal application is heard – many months later – the Court is required to engage in a full “merits assessment”. Under clause 1(2) the Claimant must show it is more likely than not that the claim will succeed at trial. This a very high bar and is a fundamental change from the Canadian original – where the claimant simply has to show that there are “grounds to believe” that the claim has substantial merit and the defendant has no valid defence. The Canadian courts have repeatedly made clear that this is a low bar and is not equivalent to summary judgment. The Bill ignores the lessons from Canada. It means that there will have to be a hearing at which the merits of the case must be decided. This is likely to be a substantial hearing and, it appears, is  intended to be conducted without oral evidence or disclosure.

It may be very difficult for the claimant to show, at this stage, that they are going to win. Media claims, such as defamation and privacy, are fraught with complexities which may depend at least in part on the conduct and approach of the defendant. Without any disclosure it might be very difficult for a claimant to show, for example, that it is more likely than not that a “public interest” defence would fail.

The Court then has to consider clause 1(3). This says that the case must not be dismissed if the harm suffered as a result of the publication is “sufficiently serious” that the public interest in permitting the claim to continue outweighs the public interest in dismissing the claim. It is not clear what this means or how it relates to clause 1(2). It seems likely that there is a drafting error here and that the intention is that, as in Canada, this is a second hurdle to be overcome by a claimant, rather than an alternative route to advancing the claim.

The wording of this provision is confusing. What, presumably, is to be balanced is the public interest in the defendant’s Article 10 rights freedom of expression against the public interest in a claimant’s Article 8 right to reputation, private and family life. The Canadian case law shows that this “weighing exercise” is the most fact-sensitive and least predictable part of the analysis, and the stage at which defendants most often lose.

The exercise necessarily involves looking at the value of the expression (which must include, for example, the likelihood of factual claims being true) against the nature and extent of the reputational harm being caused to the claimant. This is not straightforward. It does not lend itself to swift, economical disposal.

Costs

When the application has been determined the Court must make an order for costs. This costs regime provides another overwhelming advantage to defendants. If the application is successful then the defendant must be awarded costs on the indemnity basis “unless such an award is inappropriate”: clause 2(1). However, if the application fails, the claimant is not entitled to recover any costs “unless the court  determines such an award is just and appropriate”: clause 2(2).

In Canada it has been noted that this costs provision incentivises defendants to bring Anti-SLAPP applications because, even if they fail, they are likely to avoid having to pay costs. Bearing in mind the fact that the Court is required to carry out a full “merits” analysis by clause 1(2), the costs are likely to be considerable.

There is a clear and obvious risk that a meritorious claimant who successfully resists a dismissal application will incur very substantial costs that cannot be recovered. This is a significant restriction on access to justice which is plainly open to abuse,

Poor claimant, rich defendant

The Bill provides protection for defendants in a category of case which has not been the subject of complaint by Anti-SLAPP campaigners and one in which it might be thought, the public interest, strongly favours the claimant.

Take this example. The Daily Mail, publishes an article about the activities of a campaigner at a prominent environmental NGO. The article alleges that there are links between this individual and a corrupt foreign government. The allegation, it turns out, is completely false and the Daily Mail has failed properly to investigate and, as a result, could not if the matter came to trial rely successfully on the “public interest” defence.

The claimant, understandably distraught by the article, sues the Daily Mail. The claim is a strong one. But the action ticks the boxes in the Bill: (1) the claim relates to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression; (2) the subject matter is a matter of public interest. This means that the Daily Mail can take advantage of the protections of the Bill.

In other words:

  • The Daily Mail can make an application under clause 1 for early determination.
  • In the meantime, the claim is stayed.
  • The claimant may be required to provide security for costs
  • The claimant must show that the claim is more likely than not to succeed at trial and that the balance favours the claim proceeding.
  • Even assuming that the claimant can overcome the hurdles in clauses 1(2) and 1(3), she will not ordinarily be entitled to her costs.

This means that the Daily Mail will have delayed the claim by many months with little costs risk. It will have put the claimant to stress and expense and prevented her from a justified vindication of her reputation for a lengthy period.

It is difficult to believe that this is a result that most Anti-SLAPP campaigners would welcome but it follows inexorably from the Bill’s unfocussed provisions.

Oh Canada!

As mentioned above, the Bill is based on “Anti-SLAPP” legislation in Canada. This has not been a great success.  In Canada 50% of Anti-SLAPP motions fail but take many months to resolve and often involve costs of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Anti-SLAPP motion has itself become a strategic litigation weapon. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario said in the case of Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., 2023 ONCA 129

“Ironically, a procedure intended to avoid costly, unmeritorious, protracted defamation lawsuits has developed into a platform for sometimes costly, unmeritorious and protracted litigation”. 

In a more recent case, the same Court described the Canadian legislation as

“poorly drafted and confusing. It has led to much litigation, which is ironic since its express purposes are to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest and to promote public participation in debates on such matters … [It] is in desperate need of a makeover, if not repeal and replacement” (Benchwood Builders v Prescott 2025 ONCA 171 [14]).

It is this unsatisfactory legislation which the Bill is copying – though with added advantages for defendants making it significantly worse and more unbalanced.

Conclusion

In short, the Bill is not focussed on “SLAPPs”. It gives both meritorious and unmeritorious defendants significant advantages while increasing the costs and complexity of media litigation.  It will lead to further complex and expensive applications with very uncertain outcomes, the very opposite of what is needed in this area of law.

Finally, there must also be be serious doubts as to whether the Bill is compatible with Convention Rights.  Its gives obvious and serious “fair trial” concerns – with meritorious claimants being potentially denied access to justice and Article 8 rights being wrongly subordinated to the Article 10 rights of defendants.

The Justice Secretary (at one time) and others have suggested that this is an issue which should be referred to the Law Commission who could conduct research into the SLAPP issue and the operation of legislation in other common law jurisdictions. They could then, if appropriate, suggest thought-through solutions to address to any problem. This Bill, with its many obvious deficiencies, strongly underlines the desirability of that approach.

Hugh Tomlinson KC is a member of the Matrix Chambers media and information group and an editor of Inforrm.

These issues are discussed in a debate between Hugh Tomlinson KC and Gavin Millar KC on the most recent episode of the Double Jeopardy podcast.