In April 2026, the Divisional Court handed down its judgment in R (Thompson and Carlo) v The Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis [2026] EWHC 915 (Admin), the second major judicial challenge to the use of Live Facial Recognition (LFR) by law enforcement in England and Wales.
The court was asked to consider whether the Metropolitan Police Service’s overt LFR policy met the legal standard of being sufficiently clear and foreseeable to justify interference with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Metropolitan Police Service succeeded on both grounds. This post examines the court’s reasoning and considers the significant questions that the challenge’s narrow framing left unanswered..
The case was the second major judicial challenge to the use of Live Facial Recognition (LFR) by law enforcement in England and Wales, following R (Bridges) v South Wales Police [2020]. Unlike Bridges, which encompassed broader considerations of human rights, data protection, and equality law, this case took a considerably narrower approach, examining whether the current policy used by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) conferred too broad a discretion on individual police officers when deciding on who and where LFR could target. Nonetheless, this narrow scope leaves unanswered questions surrounding the broader legality of the LFR practices adopted by the MPS.
Who brought the claim?
The first claimant was Shaun Thompson, who, in February 2024, was falsely matched, stopped, questioned, detained, and threatened with arrest by police officers. In this instance, Thompson was falsely matched against his brother, whose data was held on the watchlist whilst on bail for a suspected offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm on him. The second claimant was Silkie Carlo, director of the civil liberties organisation Big Brother Watch, who, due to the presence of LFR, has modified her behaviour by avoiding protests and public events where it has been deployed. Although both claimants’ experiences reflected broader concerns about discrimination and chilling effects, the submissions they advanced were surprisingly narrow and did not comprise a comprehensive challenge to the legality of LFR.
What was the focus of the case?
The court considered two grounds, which were framed around Article 8 (Ground 1) and Articles 10 and 11 (Ground 2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. It was accepted that there was interference with these rights, so the focus was placed on whether this interference was in accordance with the law (Article 8) or prescribed by law (Articles 10 and 11). The claimants contended that the MPS’s Overt LFR policy lacked ‘sufficient clarity and foreseeability’ to limit arbitrariness in where and whom its deployments could target, and, as such, was not in accordance with the law. As there was no material difference in the claims, both grounds 1 and 2 were considered together.
The decision: Was the policy sufficiently clear and foreseeable?
In their critique of the MPS policy, the claimants identified three issues, in which they argued the policy lacked sufficient clarity and foreseeability:
- The why issue: The court acknowledged that the purpose and objectives of LFR, as stated in the policy, were broadly defined as locating individuals on watchlists and deterring and disrupting criminal activity. The court held that the ‘why’ issue was resolved by limiting LFR to three ‘use cases’: crime and missing-person hotspots, protective security operations, and locating individuals where there is specific intelligence. The claimants’ submissions focused solely on crime hotspots, emphasising how the ‘who’ and ‘where’ issues arose.
- The who issue: For crime hotspots, the policy sets out five categories of persons eligible for watchlist inclusion, linked to specific offence types or court orders. The court was satisfied that this framework adequately limited officer discretion, so that the types of targeted offences were foreseeable. Notably, the court was not directed to consider the necessity of these offence categories. Proportionality was discussed, but only to assess whether the policy’s framework provided adequate guidance to decision-makers; the court did not examine whether any specific deployment was proportionate in practice.
- The where issue: The court held that the policy made it ‘readily apparent‘ that a crime hotspot was a small geographical area (SGA). In practice, SGAs are defined by a hexagonal grid superimposed on London, with each hexagon scored using crime data over a three-year period. Hexagons with crime rates in the top 25% of the Command Unit’s territory are designated crime hotspots. Alongside crime data, the MPS relied upon ‘operational experience’, which the claimants considered too subjective. The court disagreed, finding it was distinguishable from the whims of individual officers, as it represented the evidence-based judgments made on the basis of ‘specialist and corporate knowledge’ of London policing.
Taking the policy as a whole, the court distinguished between Bridges, observing that, unlike the practices of South Wales Police, the MPS had introduced clear criteria for determining who and where LFR could be targeted. From the limited perspective of foreseeability, the policy did not breach the ECHR. Thompson has since indicated his intention to appeal the decision. Beyond the outcome, it is important to consider this judgment in the broader context of LFR regulation, highlighting what the claimants’ submissions did not address.
The Limited Scope of the Judgment
The outcome has been marked as a victory for the MPS, bolstering arguments for wider use of LFR. One limitation that will receive considerable attention is that, due to the claimants’ narrow submission, the court did not consider whether the MPS’s use of LFR was necessary, only whether the use was foreseeable (see Daragh Murray’s thoughts). Alongside this issue, the judgment leaves several other significant questions unanswered, three of which are addressed below:
- Discrimination: The claimants submitted that the policy may lead to LFR being disproportionately deployed in areas inhabited by ethnic minority communities (a concern supported by wider reporting). The policy referenced protected characteristics and discrimination in two main ways: the construction of watchlists (in relation to children as a vulnerable group, those with a disability, and those who have undergone or are undergoing gender reassignment) and broader considerations under Article 14 of the ECHR (freedom from discrimination).
Regarding the second, the policy states that authorising officers ‘should consider’ whether the circumstances of the deployment are likely to affect particular protected groups. Despite the policy’s discussion of ‘sensitive locations’ (reflecting reasonable expectations of privacy), it would be a stretch to equate this with preventing the racially discriminatory selection of deployment locations. Given the obligations of the Public Sector Equality Duty, the fact that this was ‘no more than faintly asserted’ by the claimants represents a missed opportunity for them to address a pressing concern of LFR deployment.
- The repeated use of watchlists: A core element of LFR is that each deployment’s watchlist is specifically curated to ensure that each individual is uploaded only when strictly necessary and proportionate. The claimants submitted that the presence of two identically sized watchlists indicated the MPS had reused watchlists across different locations, demonstrating an arbitrary application of LFR. Despite the court accepting that ‘the same watchlist may have been used twice for different locations’, this argument would involve questioning the application of the policy, which fell outside the scope of the court’s judgment.
- The Future Application of LFR: The court declined to consider the extent to which the policy could apply to permanent camera systems (such as the one in Croydon), describing it as ‘speculation’. However, as noted by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, the current use of LFR is likely to change with ‘LFR entering the static CCTV camera network.’ Despite the current policy primarily addressing mobile deployments, as LFR use evolves to encompass broader practices, including the implementation of permanent LFR infrastructure, the policy must be amended to ensure the new developments are subject to adequate legal governance.
How will this impact the Future of Facial Recognition?
The significance of Thompson and Carlo has already extended beyond its immediate legal findings, bolstering arguments for wider use and investment in LFR. This judgment comes at a critical time, as the Home Office closed its consultation on reforming the use of biometrics in law enforcement in February 2026. Given the timing, it is likely this case will influence the framing of future law, where the outcome of the case will fit within a broader narrative that facilitates law enforcement LFR use. However, given the limited scope of Thompson and Carlo, many questions remain unanswered. Until these questions are addressed, the legality of LFR policy rests on an incomplete legal analysis, one that will need to be revisited, whether through appeal or more substantive legislative reform.
Dr William Page is a Teaching Fellow at Birmingham Law School
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