Case Law: Stunt v Associated Newspapers, Mail heads off attempt by businessman to prevent use of personal data in important decision on the Data Protection Act – Keith Mathieson

6 04 2017

In an important judgment in the case of Stunt v Associated Newspapers ([2017] EWHC 695 (QB)) that will be reassuring to news media organisations, the High Court has determined that section 32(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998 is not incompatible with EU law.  Read the rest of this entry »





The “Journalism Exemption” in the Data Protection Act: Part 2, Some Practicalities – Hugh Tomlinson QC

29 03 2017

In Part 1 of this post I argued that the mandatory conditions for the application of the “journalism exemption” in section 32 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (“the DPA”) are strict and required careful case by case consideration.  In this post I will consider some practical consequences of this analysis. Read the rest of this entry »





The “Journalism Exemption” in the Data Protection Act: Part 1, The Law – Hugh Tomlinson QC

28 03 2017

In recent years there has been a new focus by media lawyers on the operation of the “statutory privacy” provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 (“the DPA”).  The Leveson Report and the resulting ICO publication “Data Protection and Journalism: a guide for the media” (“the ICO Guide”) has reminded us that the media must comply with the provisions of the act. Most importantly, the Court of Appeal’s “deletion” of section 13(2) (see our post here) has meant that general damages for distress are now available in DPA claims without proof of financial loss. Read the rest of this entry »





Data Protection: Pre-publication claims and section 32(4), the case for disapplication – Hugh Tomlinson QC

28 02 2017

privacySection 32 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (“the DPA”) contains a curious provision apparently designed to prevent “pre-publication” claims where unpublished journalistic, literary or artistic material is involved.  There is no basis for this provision in the Data Protection Directive  (“the Directive”) and it appears to be inconsistent with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and a clear candidate for disapplication. Read the rest of this entry »