On Monday 1 September 2025, comedy writer Graham Linehan, was arrested by five armed police officers at Heathrow Airport where he was returning to from the US. The grounds for the arrest were that Mr Linehan was reasonably suspected of having committed an offence of inciting violence against a protected group by posts on the X (formerly Twitter) platform in April 2025.
It appears that the arrest related to three posts on X in April 2025, in particular this one
The arrest has attracted considerable criticism. Supporters of Mr Linehan’s views on trans issues have described the arrest as “shameful” and suggested that “free speech in Britain is on life support“. Health Secretary Wes Streeting has said that ministers need to “look at” laws concerning online speech. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Mark Rowley, has said that his officers are in an “impossible position” and called for a change in the law.
Mr Linehan is a provocateur. He has been a vocal – it might be thought obsessive – critic of transgender activism on X and other platforms. He is due to go on trial shortly on separate charges of harassment and criminal damage involving a transgender activist. He makes statements by which it appears he intends to provoke and offend transgender people.
The law undoubtedly protects offensive speech, provided that it does not incite violence (see the well known dictum of Sedley LJ in Redmond-Bate v DPP [1999] EWHC Admin 733 [20]). It is arguable that Mr Lineham’s post crossed the line – particularly bearing in mind the vulnerability of transgender people and the hostility which they often encounter. But, bearing in mind the whole post, the position is not straightforward. There are some echoes of the notorious “Twitter joke” prosecution (Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] 1 WLR 1833).
All that being said, was this really a case in which it was appropriate to arrest Mr Linehan? In order for there to be power lawfully to arrest a person without a warrant (and there does not seem to have been one in this case), a police officer must have reasonable grounds
(a) for suspecting that an offence has been committed; and
(b) for believing that the arrest is necessary for one of 6 reasons set out in law (see section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984).
As to (a) the police clearly believed that they had reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence had been committed – and the hurdle here is not a high one.
As to (b), we do not know on what basis the arresting officer believed that it was necessary arrest Mr Linehan. At first sight, it is difficult to see how any legally permitted reason could apply: his name and address were clearly known, he was not going to cause injury or loss to property and an arrest was not necessary “to allow the prompt and effective investigation” of an offence alleged to have been committed over 4 months earlier.
But even assuming, for the moment, that the police had both reasonable grounds for suspicion and for belief that the arrest was necessary they were under no obligation to carry it out. The public debate on this arrest seems to have been conducted on the wholly false basis that, if the police have reason to suspect that an offence has been committed, they are obliged to arrest the suspect. This seems to be the basis of Sir Mark Rowley’s defence of the arresting officers and his apparent complaint that they officers are forced to act by bad laws.
However, it is well established that the police retain an “executive discretion” as to whether or not to arrest someone they reasonably suspect of having committed an offence. This is clear from the wording of section 24 which begins “A constable may arrest without warrant …” (emphasis added). This is the same wording as previous statutes (see generally Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437). This, like all other exercises of discretion by public officials, must be done in a way which is compatible with Convention rights – the Article 8 rights of trans women and the Article 10 rights of speakers. A proper balancing of rights must be carried out.
In other words, even if the police were correct in concluding that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting Mr Linehan had committed and offence and (somewhat implausibly) that there were reasonable grounds for believing it was necessary to arrest him they still had a discretion as to whether or not to exercise their power of arrest.
In this case there are clearly strong arguments against making an arrest. In particular, there was no immediate risk of repetition, the alleged offence was historic, Mr Linehan’s whereabouts were known to the police. An arrest, as opposed, for example to a request to attend a police station for an interview under caution, is a draconian remedy which is difficult to justify particularly when it is carried out by armed officers in an airport.
In short, “bad law” did not compel the Metropolitan to send five officers to arrest someone at Heathrow airport for post which was over 4 months old. It was their own bad decision making which has caused public criticism and damaged police efforts to deal with online threats of violence.
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