On 11 January 2023, Andrew Bridgen, who was then a Conservative MP, tweeted a link to an article suggesting a connection between COVID vaccination and serious adverse health conditions, commenting: ‘As one consultant cardiologist said to me this is the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust’.

At Prime Minister’s Questions later that day, Matt Hancock, who was then also a Conservative MP and had famously served as health minister during the COVID-19 crisis, asked then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak whether he agreed that ‘disgusting, antisemitic, anti-vax conspiracy theories’ had no place in the House of Commons or wider society.  Sunak did agree.

Immediately afterwards, Hancock tweeted a video clip of the exchange in the House of Commons, together with the words:

‘The disgusting and dangerous anti-semitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific conspiracy theories spouted by a sitting MP this morning are unacceptable and have absolutely no place in our society’.

Procedural history

Issue, and attempted strike out on reference

In May 2023, Bridgen issued a claim for libel against Hancock, complaining of the allegation of antisemitism.  He served proceedings that September.  In December 2023, Hancock applied to strike out the claim, contending that the issue of reference was deficiently pleaded.  To succeed in a libel claim, a claimant must prove that the words would be understood to refer to them by the reasonable reader.  Normally that is straightforward, because the claimant is named in the publication.  Where, as in this case, they are not, a claimant may seek to persuade the Court that people acquainted with him would nevertheless understand the publication to refer to him (‘ordinary reference’), or that readers with knowledge of particular facts, would do so (‘innuendo reference’).  In its original formulation, Bridgen’s claim relied on ordinary reference.  Although there was mention of innuendo, the particular facts relied upon to support a reference innuendo case were not pleaded.  Hancock contended that Bridgen’s claim did not sufficiently articulate his case on reference and should be struck out accordingly.  That application was heard by Steyn J on 1 March 2024, with judgment handed down on 20 March 2024 (Bridgen v Hancock [2024] EWHC 623 (KB))  Steyn J rejected Bridgen’s case on ordinary reference, finding that the reference to ‘a sitting MP’ could not possibly identify Bridgen to those acquainted with him, and that Bridgen’s case was inevitably dependent on readers of the tweet having knowledge of other events that had occurred, in particular, in the hours before the tweet.  She agreed that, as it was then formulated, Bridgen’s pleading on reference was defective, but considered that this defect was not only capable of being cured, but that Bridgen would have ‘little difficulty’ in establishing reference innuendo.  On that basis, she gave Bridgen an opportunity to amend his claim.

Determination of meaning

Bridgen subsequently filed Amended Particulars of Claim on 1 May 2024.  The case then proceeded to a preliminary issues hearing, to determine the meaning of Hancock’s tweet, and whether it constituted a statement of fact or opinion.  That was heard before Collins Rice J on 12 June 2024, with judgment in Bridgen v Hancock [2024] EWHC 1603 (KB) handed down on 24 June 2024.

Bridgen contended that the tweet would have been understood to mean that he was an antisemite, and that this was a statement of fact.  Hancock contended that the tweet would have been understood to mean that Bridgen had disseminated views which, in Hancock’s opinion, were antisemitic in nature.  These contentions were both advanced without prejudice to any remaining dispute on the issue of reference, which will be determined at trial.

Whilst Mr Bridgen complains only of the allegation of antisemitism, the Court must take the whole of a publication into account when assessing meaning.  Collins Rice J also took account of the context that the tweet was an example of ‘political speech’, observing that the hypothetical reasonable reader of such a tweet would have a general awareness of public debate or controversy around (a) vaccination in general, covid vaccination in particular, and Mr Hancock’s record of responsibility for and public comment on the latter and (b) allegations of antisemitism in UK politics and public life.

Although the clip from Prime Minister’s Questions formed a part of the tweet, the parties agreed that Parliamentary Privilege meant that they could not pray it in aid, and Collins Rice J considered the meaning of the tweet without reference to the content of the video, beyond the fact that Hancock was repeating what he had previously said in Parliament.

Collins Rice J found that the reference to ‘this morning’ would clearly anchor the tweet, in the minds of the reasonable readers, to a recent event, and that they would understand that Hancock was using the fact of that event to distance himself from the sort of views he was condemning. The tweet was more about Hancock’s views, than Bridgen’s.  Its rhetorical nature would have been understood as amplifying his views, rather than signifying objective factuality.  The language amounted to a sweeping dismissal of the claims referred to, and not to the specific beliefs of the unnamed MP.  The reader would understand that Hancock was expressing his strong opinions of the character, or mode of expression, of what had been said.  This was robust, opinionated, reactive political comment.  With all this in mind, Collins Rice J held that the tweet meant that:

An unnamed MP had said something that morning related to vaccination [fact] which was baseless, unscientific, dangerous and offensive, including because its character was antisemitic [opinion]

The basis for the opinion element of the tweet was indicated (that which had been said ‘by a sitting MP this morning’).

Further pleadings, and application for summary judgment

As is commonplace in defamation proceedings, Bridgen filed Re-Amended Particulars of Claim following the determination on meaning, on 15 July 2024.  Hancock filed a Defence on 30 August 2024, disputing Bridgen’s case on reference (in part) and serious harm to reputation, and pleading the defence of honest opinion, pursuant to section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013.  Bridgen filed a Reply on 14 October 2024, averring, amongst other things, that an honest person could not have held the opinion which Hancock had expressed; an honest person would understand that Bridgen had not been belittling the Holocaust but amplifying the seriousness of the vaccine concerns.  Bridgen also contended that he would demonstrate at trial that Hancock did not, in any event, hold the opinion he had expressed (pursuant to section 3(5) of the Defamation Act 2013, a claimant can defeat the honest opinion defence if he can show that the particular defendant did not, in fact, hold the opinion).

On 28 October 2024, Hancock applied for summary judgment, contending that Bridgen had no real prosect of succeeding on the issue of serious harm to reputation, and/or resisting the defence of honest opinion.  Failing that, he sought the striking out of Bridgen’s pleading pursuant to section 3(5).  This came before Collins Rice J on 12 March 2025, with judgment handed down on 14 April 2025 (Bridgen v Hancock [2025] EWHC 926 (KB)).

Serious harm

A claimant in defamation is required to show that the statement complained of has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to their reputation.  The harm arises in the minds of the publishees; it is not necessary for a claimant to prove any specific adverse consequence, although it may be powerful evidence.  Bridgen’s case on serious harm is a substantially inferential one; relying on the gravity of the libel and the extent of publication.  For the purposes of the summary judgment application, Collins Rice J simply had to do determine whether Bridgen’s case on serious harm was ‘fanciful’ and suffering from ‘an absence of reality’.  She determined that it was not.  This was capable of being found to be a relatively grave libel, and a mass publication case, published by a person of considerable influence.  Bridgen’s case was adequately pleaded.  It was not ‘entirely without substance’.

Hancock argued that this missed the point.  There was a logical fault-line running through Bridgen’s case.  It was (now) an innuendo reference case, and Hancock asserts that the only readers capable of recognising Bridgen as the subject, would be those who were directly or indirectly aware of Bridgen’s own tweet that morning.  They would have made up their own minds about it, and if they thought worse of Bridgen it would be as a result of his own words, and not Hancock’s.  There was therefore no prospect of Bridgen proving that any harm was caused by Hancock’s tweet.

Collins Rice J acknowledged that any libel claimant complaining of a ‘calling out’ libel – whereby the publisher is criticising the claimant’s own words – faces the challenge of showing that any harm to reputation was caused by the calling out, and not that which was being called out.  This was particularly so in an innuendo reference case where the claimant’s own words were being relied upon to establish the cause of action.  However, the Judge did not think that this challenge for Bridgen was so acute as to be unanswerable.  It was still more than merely arguable that Hancock’s intervention – when looking at the net effect – caused serious harm to Bridgen’s reputation.  This would have to be determined at trial.

Honest opinion

As above, Collins Rice J had previously found that the defamatory element of the tweet was an expression of opinion.  In his Defence, Hancock pleaded that this was an honestly held opinion, the factual basis for which was ‘incontrovertible’.  In his application for summary judgment, he asked the Court to find that Bridgen had no real prospect of successful disputing that an honest person could hold the opinion on the factual basis pleaded, or that Hancock did, in fact, hold it.  He argued that it was, to a degree, self-evident that an honest person could think that to draw a comparison between the COVID vaccination programme and the Holocaust was to belittle the historic experience of the Jewish people, and that this was antisemitic in character.

Collins Rice J observed that demonstrating that an honest person could consider Bridgen’s tweet to be antisemitic in character was a relatively low bar given the extremely wide nature of the defence, but it was nevertheless a burden for him to discharge.  Bridgen was seeking to argue that the allegation was so toxic, that even in the context of political speech, it would be found at trial to be insufficiently pertinent to what he had said: an honest person would recoginse that it crossed a line.  Collins Rice J thought that there were ‘fine shades’ of judgement engaged but was not ultimately persuaded to call Bridgen’s prospects of success unreal.  It was potentially significant that none of the other comments on Bridgent’s tweet which had been brought to Collins Rice J’s attention had condemned Bridgen in precisely the same way that Hancock had.  The issue was highly evaluative in character and was not a matter to be foreclosed on an interlocutory basis.

Section 3(5)

Bridgen’s Reply addressed section 3(5) over 21 paragraphs, directed, in part to Hancock’s failure to plead a truth defence, in part to what Bridgen claims is the ‘objective unreasonableness’ of the opinion, and in part to a so-called ‘wider animus’ against him by people seeking to silence his voice on the vaccination issues.  Collins Rice J thought that much relating to the failure to plead a truth defence and the ‘wider animus’ was inapt or irrelevant.  A defendant is under no obligation to plead a truth defence, and the fact that he does not is irrelevant to consideration of the statutory honest opinion defence.  Meanwhile, the ‘wider animus’ pleading articulated no connection between the alleged wider animus and the tweet which it was fair for Hancock to be expected to answer (and its consideration was likely to obstruct the efficient disposal of the proceedings).  However, Collins Rice J noted that it is possible to base a section 3(5) ‘counter defence’ on an evidential groundwork from which the Court may draw an inference that the defendant likely did not genuinely hold the opinion.  Bridgen contends that the ‘antisemitic in character’ allegation was a gratuitous bid to silence and politically harm him; something that it suited Hancock to say, rather than something he actually thought.

In that regard, Collins Rice J held that Bridgen’s inferential case was adequately set out in his pleading.  It would not be incoherent for the trial Judge to find that the honest opinion defence was made out on its merits, but that ‘antisemitic in character’ was an exercise in vituperative rhetoric, rather than genuine opinion.  Whilst the unfairness or unreasonableness of an opinion, and any ill-will on the part of a defendant, will not necessarily mean that the opinion could not have been honestly held, it may be evidence that it was not, in fact, held.  In the end, whether someone holds an opinion is a matter of fact, and what was certain was that not all the evidence which could assist to determine the question was available at that stage.  The fact that the section 3(5) ‘counter defence’ was to go to trial was a further compelling reason for the section 3 defence itself to go to trial.  It would be artificial and potentially unfair to both parties to predetermine and foreclose on the defence, when trial of the counter-defence is capable of giving a trial judge perspective on the defence itself which is not presently available.

Accordingly, Collins Rice J declined to give summary judgment on section 1, section 3, or section 3(5), and gave Bridgen a limited opportunity to submit a revised pleading on section 3(5) which is more focused and consistent with her findings.

What happens next

Although both his applications met with some success, Hancock has now failed in two attempts to entirely dispose of Bridgen’s claim, and whilst Hancock must still feel relatively confident of succeeding at trial, Collins Rice J’s most recent judgment has articulated a way in which Bridgen could – in theory – succeed, despite the broad nature of the honest opinion defence.  Both parties have probably found the early skirmishes somewhat bruising, and it now remains to be seen whether they both have the determination to go through a full trial.

This post originally appeared on the Brett Wilson Media and Communications Law Blog and is reproduced with permission and thanks.